


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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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
3 NOVEMBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 44)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 25 - 31 OCTOBER 1971

Moscow (3153 items)

Brezhnev in France	(6%)	34%
[Brezhnev Speeches	(--)	15%]
Kosygin in Cuba	(1%)	7%
Kosygin in Canada	(13%)	3%
China	(2%)	3%
[U.S. Vote on China	(--)	2%]
Brezhnev in GDR	(--)	2%
Indochina	(3%)	1%

Peking (1727 items)

Domestic Issues	(40%)	29%
[Revolutionary Songs	(--)	3%]
Campaign		
U.S. Vote on China	(2%)	23%
Afro-Asian Table Tennis	(--)	6%
Matches		
Indochina	(7%)	6%
PRC-Belgian Diplomatic	(--)	4%
Relations		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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PRC IN UNITED NATIONS

PEKING NAMES DELEGATION, DEMANDS FULL ROC EXPULSION

Peking waited four days after the 25 October UN vote on seating the PRC to announce that it would "soon send its representatives," then followed up on 2 November with the namelist of its delegation. The PRC first announced its intentions in a government statement on the 29th stipulating that the resolution adopted by the General Assembly "must be speedily implemented in its entirety" and specifying that this means expulsion of the ROC from all UN bodies "and related agencies."

Confidence in compliance with this demand was indicated by Peking's failure to make it a condition for the dispatch of a PRC delegation. Shortly after releasing the government statement, Peking disseminated the text of Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei's 29 October message officially notifying U Thant that the PRC would soon send its delegation and pointedly citing the language of the secretary general's 26 October message to Peking to the effect that the General Assembly had decided to restore to the PRC "all its rights" and to expel the ROC representatives from the world body and "all the organizations related to it." Also noting that Thant had advised "all the bodies and related agencies" of the United Nations of the UNGA resolution, Chi expressed confidence that the resolution will be "speedily implemented in its entirety."

The namelist was contained in a second Chi message to Thant, on 2 November, disclosing that the PRC delegation will be headed by Chiao Kuan-hua, a vice foreign minister whose responsibilities have included both Soviet and American affairs and who has served as the chief Chinese negotiator at the Sino-Soviet border talks. Huang Hua, the PRC ambassador to Canada, was named as his deputy. Another message released on the 2d designated Huang as the PRC's permanent representative on the Security Council. At this writing Peking media have not acknowledged Chi's 31 October message to U Thant--reported in the Western press--informing him that the PRC has chosen to be listed as "China, People's Republic of," thus appearing alphabetically as a "C" on the UN rolls and sidestepping the possibility of the PRC's taking over Security Council chairmanship for November.

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The 29 October government statement called the favorable UNGA vote a demonstration of the bankruptcy of U.S. policy as well as "a victory of Chairman Mao Tsetung's proletarian revolutionary line in foreign affairs and a victory of the whole world and all the countries upholding justice." Pledging that the PRC will "never be a superpower bullying other countries," the statement echoed the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial of the 28th when it said the vote indicates that "one or two superpowers" are losing their ability to manipulate the United Nations. It repeated the editorial's warning that the U.S. and Japanese "reactionaries" are nevertheless continuing to press their two-Chinas "scheme," adding that this includes attempting "to let the Chiang Kai-shek clique worm its way back into the United Nations under the name of a so-called 'independent Taiwan.'" Such a scheme, the statement asserted, "must never be allowed to succeed."

An NCNA dispatch on 2 November treated at length the official U.S. reaction to the 25 October vote, charging that Washington, "turning from abashment to anger, has openly hurled all kinds of abuse" against those nations supporting the Albanian resolution and has exerted pressure on them. The dispatch said White House press secretary Ziegler had conveyed to newsmen President Nixon's "irritation" over the "glee" expressed on the floor of the Assembly after the vote. It remarked that Ziegler, "having a true grasp of the President's intention," charged that this "'shocking demonstration'" could "'very seriously impair'" U.S. financial support of the organization. Noting the anti-pathy of many UN representatives to the U.S. reaction, the dispatch concluded that "no matter how much political pressure" it is going to exert or "dollar blackmail" it is going to attempt, "U.S. imperialism can by no means alter the trend of history." To date Peking has not reported the 29 October Senate vote killing the foreign aid bill.

Peking has been giving heavy publicity since the 29th to the stream of congratulatory messages from abroad on the UNGA vote, as well as to favorable comment drawn from friendly organs of the foreign press.

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TAIWAN

PEKING REAFFIRMS CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER TAIWAN

In the wake of the second Kissinger mission and the UN vote on seating the PRC, Peking has been intent on reasserting its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan and sustaining the momentum of its diplomatic drive at the expense of the ROC. The basic thrust of Peking's comment on the vote has been that a challenge to the PRC's claim to Taiwan has been defeated in the UN arena but that this was but one battle in a continuing campaign. Having been awarded a major victory over the ROC in the contest for recognition as the legitimate government of China, Peking has indicated that one of its principal concerns now is to undercut any developing sentiment in the international community favoring an independent regime on Taiwan. In this respect Peking has devoted particular attention to Japan's role, seeking to isolate the pro-Taipei elements and to generate pressures for a change in Tokyo's China policy.

Peking's reaction to the UN vote combined expressions of satisfaction over the defeat of the dual representation formula with calls for vigilance against further moves by "the U.S.-Japanese reactionaries" that would perpetuate the alienation of Taiwan from the mainland. A 29 October PRC Government statement, echoing Peking's initial reaction to the vote, warned that the United States and Japan are "not reconciled to their defeat" and will pursue a two-Chinas policy by promoting an independent Taiwan. "All indications show," according to a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the previous day, that the United States and Japan "are stepping up their maneuvers" in behalf of Taiwan independence as a means of severing the island from the PRC.

Peking restated the basic elements of its line on Taiwan in another PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, also on 28 October, hailing the establishment of diplomatic relations with Belgium. Declaring that the "liberation" of Taiwan is China's internal affair and "brooks no foreign interference," the editorial recited Peking's objections to variants of a two-Chinas approach, including an independent Taiwan. The list contained a new variant, "one China, two governments," a formula which would acknowledge that Taiwan is a part of China while recognizing the existence of two viable governments. As quoted in a 1 November NCNA report on a Japanese Diet debate, Prime Minister Sato pointed out on the day after the UN vote that "two governments exist in China."

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The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on diplomatic relations with Belgium reiterated a standard demand that the United States "must withdraw all its armed forces and military installations" from Taiwan and the Straits. Also standard was the editorial's declaration that the "Chinese people are determined to liberate their sacred territory Taiwan." Historical and legal arguments for the claim that Taiwan has been "China's sacred territory since ancient times" had been assembled in an NCNA dispatch disseminated internationally during the UN debate on China. Reviewing the historical background, the dispatch said Taiwan and the Pescadores have been "important strategic regions in China's coastal defense" since the Ming dynasty. The dispatch concluded by citing a statement by Chou En-Lai issued on 28 June 1950 in reaction to President Truman's order for the interdiction of the Taiwan Straits shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War. Chou was quoted as charging that the U.S. move constituted armed aggression against the territory of China and "total violation of the United Nations Charter"--a possible hint that Peking might use the United Nations as a forum for pressing its case on the Taiwan issue.

U.S.-ROC RELATIONS Peking's comment on the UN vote has notably avoided drawing implications for Sino-U.S. relations from Washington's stand on the China representation issue, but Peking has taken note of statements from Washington assessing the effects of the vote on U.S. relations with the ROC. An NCNA report on 1 November, noting that "some U.S. personages in power" are not reconciled to the defeat of the two-Chinas formula, observed that Secretary Rogers "hurriedly" held a press conference on the day after the UN vote and declared that the ties between the United States and the ROC remain unaffected. NCNA also noted that the secretary told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 27 October that U.S. defense arrangements with the ROC would continue. In a passage containing a reference to the U.S.-ROC mutual defense treaty, the NCNA report called attention to the Senate's decision on 28 October not to repeal the 1955 emergency resolution by the two houses of Congress authorizing the President to use armed force in the Taiwan Straits. NCNA noted that repeal of the resolution was proposed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "last July"--an implicit reminder that the committee's action was taken in the wake of the President's announcement that he would be visiting Peking.

Reflecting Peking's sensitivity regarding the U.S. commitment to the defense of Taiwan, the NCNA report quoted a senator as saying, in connection with the decision not to repeal the 1955

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resolution, that "we should not indicate to anybody anywhere in the world we are in the mind to abandon the protection to those in Taiwan." This remark was taken by NCNA as an indication that "U.S. imperialism" hopes to "divide the sacred territory of China."

NEW RECOGNITION
AGREEMENTS

Two recent recognition agreements, with Belgium on 25 October and with Peru on 2 November, reverted to a formula on the Taiwan question that was introduced in the PRC-Canadian agreement in October 1970--the first in the series of recognition agreements that is still continuing. Using this formula, the other country "takes note" of Peking's claim to Taiwan without endorsing it.* As in previous communiquees in which the other country "takes note" of Peking's claim to Taiwan, Belgium and Peru recognized the PRC Government as "the sole legal government of China." Peking's preferred terms, used in agreements with countries offering less resistance to its demands, are for recognition as "the sole legal government representing the entire Chinese people."

It is not clear why Peking was willing to revert to the Canadian formula and its variant at this time. Another formula, introduced in the recognition agreement with Kuwait in March 1971, omitted any mention of Taiwan while conferring recognition on Peking as "the sole legal government of China."** This formula was used in August 1971 agreements with Turkey and Iran during a period in which Peking had begun publicizing moves for seating the PRC in the United Nations. Peking may have introduced the Kuwait formula out of sensitivity to the speculation aroused by the formula in which a country merely "takes note" of the PRC's claim to Taiwan. Thus Peking may have preferred to sidetrack the Taiwan question while garnering diplomatic support for the UN vote rather than to use a formula suggesting a willingness to compromise on the Taiwan question. This consideration may not apply now that the compromise dual representation arrangement was defeated in the UN vote.

* Precisely speaking, Peru took note of Peking's "position" on the Taiwan question--the Canadian formula--while Belgium took note of Peking's "statement." The latter variant was first used in the November 1970 agreement with Italy, which evidently believed it reflected a shade stronger resistance to Peking's demands on the Taiwan issue.

** Previous recognition of the ROC is not a criterion distinguishing the use of the various formulas.

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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

EVIDENCE ACCUMULATES OF DECLINE IN STATUS OF LIN PIAO

There have been no references to Lin Piao in PRC radio broadcasts since an 8 October mention by the Kirin provincial radio. Apart from toasts by foreign visitors--which Peking stopped reporting from late September--and greetings messages on National Day (1 October), there has been no mention of Lin by Radio Peking or NCNA since 15 September. In an indication that Peking's closest allies have been notified that his status has changed, congratulatory messages from Albania, Romania, the DPRK, and the DRV on the UN vote for seating the PRC did not include Lin among the addressees. While Lin's protocol position would not strictly require that he be among the addressees, party-state messages from those countries--and the Albanian message was signed by the full complement of top leaders--would normally be expected to be addressed to the trinity of Mao, Lin, and Chou En-lai.

MAGAZINES' TREATMENT
OF LIN

An examination of monthly magazines published in China for both domestic and foreign consumption reveals indications of a decline in Lin's status as reflected in military reminiscences presenting him historically as little more than one among several leaders around Mao. From July through October CHINA RECONSTRUCTS carried a serialized reminiscence by one of Mao's bodyguards during the early and mid-1930's which contained a few references to Lin without especially singling out his role. The July and August issues contained other reminiscences which paid greater attention to Lin. The July issue had a story on the Yenan era which included several pictures of Lin, and in August there was a story on Lin's victory at Pinghsingkuan over the Japanese. There were no special stories devoted to Lin in the September and October issues, with the October issue mentioning his name only twice, once as party vice chairman. The November issue is not available, but a Peking dispatch by the Yugoslav news agency TANJUG said it contains only one reference to Lin, identifying him merely as vice premier--a title he did not hold during the historical period covered and one which has dropped out of use in PRC media since he became Mao's heir-designate.

The October issue of CHINA PICTORIAL--which has been distributed in its English edition but which was withdrawn from circulation in Peking--contains a photograph of Lin and Mao on its cover. This

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issue, which commemorates the party's 50th anniversary on 1 July this year, was probably printed several weeks in advance and contains no news past late August.

OTHER LEADERS The 1930's reminiscence by one of Mao's bodyguards was also carried in the July issue of CHINESE LITERATURE but with a few differences--not affecting Lin's status--which might indicate that some past and present Politburo members have recently fallen into disfavor. The CHINESE LITERATURE version carried a reference to Politburo member Liu Po-cheng which was dropped from the August installment in RECONSTRUCTS, and the October installment dropped mentions of former Politburo members Nieh Jung-chen and Chen Yun, both still Central Committee members.

The August issue of CHINESE LITERATURE carried another military reminiscence, this one dealing with Mao during the Northern Shensi campaign after the retreat from Yenan in 1947. Since Lin was not with Mao at the time, his absence from the article reflects historical fact, even though at the height of praise for Lin PRC media sometimes made it appear that Mao and Lin had been inseparable. Assuming Lin's place to some extent is "Vice Chairman" Chou En-lai, who was with Mao during this period. Chou is presented quite favorably, to the extent that the author reminisces that Chou often stayed up later and arose earlier than Mao himself. Mao, however, is presented as physically in better health, as Chou is forced to ride a stretcher briefly at one point while Mao trods indomitably on.

Of the other current leaders mentioned in the article, Wang Tung-hsing receives special notice for his heroism in combat, and Chiang Ching is shown to have been a person of importance who showed concern for ordinary people. Both this article and the previous one serialized in RECONSTRUCTS break with precedent in presenting Mao and Chiang in domestic situations--PRC media never actually state that they are married. Most of the other leaders praised are now dead, but Peking chief Hsieh Fu-chih, who has appeared in public only once in the past year and a half, was accorded a footnote clarifying that he was the Hsieh referred to in a passage praising the "Chen-Hsieh Army."

INNER MONGOLIA RADIO RESUMES LOCAL BROADCASTING PATTERN

On 3 November the Inner Mongolian radio station in Huhehot was monitored carrying locally originated programs. Since 5 January 1970

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the station had carried a solid relay of the Peking domestic service. The resumption of Inner Mongolia's local service leaves only Kweichow without local broadcasting. Kweichow's provincial radio had resumed local originations with an announcement of the formation of its provincial CCP committee on 18 May, but on 8 October the station reverted to a solid Peking relay. Past practice has indicated that lack of local broadcasting is a sign of serious problems within a province.

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INDOCHINA

The DPRK party-government delegation led by Pak Song-chol left Hanoi on 30 October after signing agreements on economic and military aid to the DRV. The joint communique, like other propaganda on the visit, stresses solidarity and friendship and contains a direct reflection of the complex situation in the communist world in the wake of President Nixon's planned visits to Peking and Moscow. However, it seems noteworthy that the communique, in contrast to the one on Podgornyy's early October visit to Hanoi, failed to repeat the standard Hanoi line on the need to work for the restoration of unity among the socialist countries. Instead it uses a Pyongyang formulation when it notes the two countries' determination to fight U.S. "imperialism" in unity with the socialist countries and other anti-imperialist forces.

Hanoi took the occasion of the North Korean visit to elaborate on the call for U.S. withdrawal in the PRG's 1 July seven-point peace proposal. Thus, DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh in a banquet speech on the 24th specified that in addition to "ending aggression" in Vietnam, withdrawal of personnel and materiel, and the liquidation of bases, the United States must end all naval and air activity in South Vietnam and stop military aid to the "Saigon puppet regime." Trinh's elaboration of the PRG proposal is repeated in the joint communique.

The damaging typhoon in South Vietnam's northern provinces prompted messages of condolence and promises of relief from PRC as well as DRV and PRG leaders. As at the time of the early November floods last year, Chou En-lai in a 1 November message to PRG leaders extended the "deep sympathy" of the Chinese Government and people, and the Red Cross Society of China announced a donation of relief materials to the people in the typhoon-stricken coastal areas. Consistent with past practice, Moscow has given only routine attention to the disaster and has said nothing about Soviet aid.

Hanoi and Front media dismiss President Thieu's inauguration on 31 October as a "farce" in keeping with his "illegal" election "farce"; and comment on Thieu's inaugural speech charges that it "reeked of gunpowder and dupery." Propaganda also characterizes the GVN's release of Viet Cong prisoners to mark the inauguration as a "deceitful trick" to mask Thieu's "crimes."

DPRK-DRV COMMUNIQUE CITES BILATERAL SOLIDARITY, FRIENDSHIP

The DPRK party-government delegation led by Pak Song-chol which arrived in Hanoi on 24 October returned home on the 30th after

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signing a joint communique and the annual aid agreement on the 29th. On its way home the delegation stayed overnight in Peking on 29-30 October and was hosted at a banquet by Chou En-lai and Li Hsien-nien. In typical fashion, talks with the Chinese leaders were described as having taken place in a "cordial and friendly atmosphere." En route to Hanoi on the 24th, the delegation had been entertained at an airport luncheon in Peking hosted by Li.

The joint DPRK-DRV communique noted that the North Koreans had been received by Ton Duc Thang and Le Duan, and that talks with Pham Van Dong and other party and government leaders had taken place in a "cordial atmosphere overflowing with militant solidarity and fraternal friendship." The communique also said that a "unanimity" of views was reached during discussions on bilateral relations and "other questions of common concern." A similar reference to unanimity of views appeared in the joint communique on Podgornyy's visit and propaganda suggests that in both cases this characterization was included at the visitors' behest. Pak Song-chol, speaking at a banquet on the 28th, said that the sides reached unanimity on all questions discussed, but Nguyen Duy Trinh did not echo this assertion. Similarly, DRV spokesmen avoided any reference to unanimity of views during Podgornyy's visit, although the Soviets repeatedly so characterized the talks.

UNITY ISSUE The DPRK-DRV communique--like the one on Podgornyy's visit--contained a standard reference to satisfaction over the development of friendship and solidarity of the two parties and peoples on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. But unlike the Soviet-DRV communique, it said nothing about efforts by "imperialist reaction" to divide the socialist countries or about the need to work for the restoration of solidarity among the socialist countries and the communist and workers parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Instead it made only a general reference to the determination of the two sides to fight U.S. imperialism "in unity with" peoples of the socialist countries, the world working class, the African, Asian, and Latin American peoples and "all progressive peoples of the world."

This is a formulation Kim Il-song had used in his speech at the Fifth KWP Congress on 2 November 1970. He had also used it in his 6 August speech this year in which he welcomed Peking's invitation to the President as a "great victory" for the Chinese

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people and world revolutionary forces. The DRV presumably would have no objection to the formulation, but it seems likely that they would have preferred the inclusion in the communique of a statement which at least noted the importance of unity among the socialist countries. And it is difficult to see how the Koreans could have objected to that in view of some of their recent propaganda. Thus, on 15 October KCNA reviewed the "teachings" of Kim Il-song on the ultimate victory of socialism, including assertions that "the unity and cohesion of the socialist countries" guarantees the defense of each socialist country and therefore must be strengthened. And a 10 October NODONG SINMUN editorial on the KWP anniversary said that the party will continue to struggle for "unity of the international communist movement and for the strengthening and development of the movement."

The North Vietnamese may have sought to include the assertions that had been in their communique with Podgornyy--and which they had pressed in their anti-Chinese polemic last summer--on "imperialist" efforts to split the socialists, and the Koreans may have objected to that. But the companion assertion in the Soviet communique on the need to work for the restoration of unity is similar to a passage in the DPRK-Romanian communique signed at the conclusion of Ceausescu's visit last June. Possibly the Koreans for their part pressed for a reference to Asian unity in the current communique and the Vietnamese demurred, with the resultant compromise on the reference to "unity" in fighting imperialism. Kim Il-song had used this vague formulation in his 6 August speech after reiterating the Pyongyang-Peking line on the need for unity of the "Asian revolutionary countries." This Asian unity line, which implicitly excludes the Soviet Union, was voiced by Pak Song-chol on two occasions during his Hanoi visit. Hanoi speakers as usual avoided the line. Le Duan came close to this formulation, however, in Peking on 11 May during his stop there en route home from his prolonged stay in the USSR after attending the CPSU Congress in March. Speaking of China's role as "the great rear" of Vietnam, he went on to say that "our front extends from Vietnam to Laos, to Cambodia, to China, and to Korea; and it is constantly expanding."

PRG PROPOSAL ELABORATED BY FOREIGN MINISTER TRINH, COMMUNIQUE

DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh took the occasion of a banquet for the North Korean delegation on 24 October to elaborate on the provisions in point one of the PRG's 1 July seven-point

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peace proposal. He closely paraphrased the language of the formal proposal in saying that "the U.S. Government must put an end to its aggression and withdraw promptly, completely, and unconditionally from South Vietnam all the armed forces, advisors, military personnel, weapons, and other war means of the U.S. and the other foreign countries in the American camp." But he then interjected the additional demand that the United States "stop all activities of the U.S. air force and navy" and "stop U.S. military aid to the puppet administration in Saigon." Trinh followed this with the demand that is contained in point one of the PRG proposal--"remove all U.S. military bases from South Vietnam." The DPRK-DRV communique, after declaring that the Vietnam question must be solved on the basis of the PRG's seven-point proposal, went on to describe the two basic provisions of the proposal--points one and two--and incorporated Trinh's elaborations as though they were part of the text of the formal proposal. In the communique, however, the elaborations come after the call for liquidation of bases.

It is not clear why the North Vietnamese chose this particular occasion to specify additional demands on the United States in the context of the PRG proposal, and why they were incorporated in the joint communique. Pyongyang's special hostility to the United States may have been a factor, and the Koreans may have been anxious to demonstrate solidarity with Hanoi in a hardened stand, particularly against the background of the two countries' diametrically opposed reactions to Peking's invitation to the President. Notably, the communique also included an attack on President Nixon: Attacking continued U.S. aggression in Indochina and the Vietnamization policy in standard terms, it observed that "since Nixon came to power the U.S. imperialists have become more obstinate, bellicose, and cunning in their maneuvers."

The North Vietnamese appear to have decided to explicitly harden their negotiating terms in light of a belief that their position has been undercut by Peking, whose invitation to the President they clearly felt had deflected world attention from the 1 July initiative and made it easier for the President to avoid a direct response. Deference to Podgorny would presumably have prevented an explicit enunciation of a hardened stand while he was in Hanoi.

Trinh did raise the question of a demand for an end to U.S. military assistance to the "puppet" administrations in Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane in his article--entitled "The Diplomatic Task in Service of the Anti-U.S. National Salvation Resistance Struggle"--in the October issue of the DRV's party journal HOC TAP.

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Trinh made this reference in a paragraph purporting to document the support for the Indochinese by "the world people's front." Claiming that each U.S. "escalation" has been greeted by greater action by the world front, which has used slogans suitable for each period, he said that previously the slogans concerned the demand for an unconditional halt of the bombing of the DRV. He added that the present slogans involve support for the PRG's seven-point proposal. Trinh described point one of the proposal cryptically as demanding that the United States fix a deadline for its withdrawal and did not explain what was involved in withdrawal. But he went on to say that against the background of the PRG proposal, the "world people's front" had demanded that the United States end aggression against all of Indochina and that the Nixon Administration "withdraw all U.S. troops, military advisers and military personnel, end U.S. military assistance to the puppet administrations in Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane and withdraw all foreign troops of the U.S. camp from South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia." There is no way of knowing when Trinh's HOC TAP article was written, and the journal carries no signed-to-the-press date. But it seems likely that it was written sometime during September at the latest.

Vietnamese communist media have consistently obscured U.S. efforts for clarification or elaboration of the PRG proposal, and they have not reported statements by Vietnamese communist leaders to the press. Thus, there was never any acknowledgment of Le Duc Tho's remarks in his interview with the New York TIMES' Anthony Lewis on 6 July regarding the question of military and economic assistance to South Vietnam. (Tho had said that after U.S. "total" withdrawal, other questions would be discussed; and when pressed as to whether this would include assistance, he said that a new basis for U.S.-South Vietnamese relations would be laid down and that point five which deals, among other things, with future economic aid "is very explicit in this connection.")

DPRK DELEGATION SIGNS AID AGREEMENTS DURING VISIT TO DRV

According to VNA and KCNA, Tran Huu Duc, Minister for the DRV Premier's Office, and Kong Chin-tae, chairman of the DPRK Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, signed "an agreement on the DPRK's nonrefund economic aid to Vietnam in 1972 and an agreement on goods exchange and payments between the two countries

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in 1972." Tran Sam, DRV Vice Minister of National Defense, and Chang Chong-hwan, DPRK Vice Minister of National Defense, signed an agreement on the DPRK's "nonrefund military aid to Vietnam in 1972." Nguyen Duy Trinh and Pak Song-chol were present at the signing ceremony.

In the past the DPRK's aid agreements have been signed by DRV vice premiers during their annual bloc tours. Last year's, signed on 17 November by Nguyen Con, were described as agreements on the DPRK's "free economic and military aid" to the DRV and on mutual delivery of commodities and payments for 1971. The contents of the agreements have never been elaborated in propaganda media. Pyongyang's current break with precedent to send a high-ranking delegation to Hanoi to sign the agreements accords with Peking's and Moscow's practice this year. The annual PRC aid agreement was concluded in Hanoi on 27 September by the Li Hsien-nien delegation, and the Soviet agreement was signed during Podgornyy's 3-8 October visit, although the signators were, as usual, Vice Premiers Le Thanh Nghi and V. Novikov.

MOSCOW REAFFIRMS DESIRE FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN INDOCHINA

Soviet support for a political settlement in Indochina was reaffirmed in the joint communique on Brezhnev's 25-30 October visit to France and on Kosygin's visits to Canada (17-26 October) and to Cuba (26-30 October), with the latter also condemning U.S. "aggressive actions" to expand the Indochina war. The Soviet-Canadian communique circumspectly said the two sides noted that Indochina continues to be a "source of anxiety" and favored the restoration of lasting peace in the area through "a political settlement which would guarantee to all the peoples of Indochina the possibility of shaping their own destiny, in accordance with their national interests and without foreign interference."

The Soviet-French communique said that both sides support an end to "foreign intervention" and a political settlement in Indochina and will make "active efforts" to facilitate such a settlement "on the basis of the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962." The Soviet-French "document on cooperation" did not explicitly mention Indochina, but it did stress that the two sides will cooperate to help bring about "restoration of peace in areas of conflict" and "the speediest attainment of a political settlement" in areas "where peace is being endangered or violated."

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Speaking on French TV on 29 October, Brezhnev passed over Indochina briefly, much as he had done in his speech on the 25th at a banquet hosted by Pompidou, merely asserting that the USSR is doing everything in its power to contribute to the liquidation of "dangerous hotbeds of war kindled by the aggressors in Indochina and the Middle East." He did not, as in a speech at a banquet he gave for Pompidou on the 27th, specifically attack U.S. aggression in Indochina as a serious obstacle to peace. It was in the latter speech that he made a thinly veiled allusion to possible Sino-U.S. collusion on Indochina, warning that the problem cannot be solved "either by attempts to impose an alien will on Vietnam by means of force or by way of behind-the-scenes machinations [zakulisnykh kombinatskiy] behind the backs of the Vietnamese people."

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DRV SCORES U.S. RAIDS IN DMZ AREA, NORTHWEST PROVINCE

Alleged U.S. attacks on North Vietnam are condemned in a routine statement by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 3 November. In addition to the usual charge of air strikes and shelling in Vinh Linh and Quang Binh--inside and north of the demilitarized zone--the statement claims that on 30 October planes rocketed "a number of locations" in Dien Bien district, Lai Chau Province, "nearly 500 kilometers northwest of Hanoi." The DRV last claimed an attack in Lai Chau Province in an 18 December 1970 spokesman's statement which charged that rockets had been fired on a village there on 15 December.

The 3 November statement says that from 21 through 31 October, the United States sent planes, including B-52's, to attack Huong Lap village and used artillery pieces south of the DMZ and warships offshore to shell the villages of Vinh Son, Vinh Giang, and Vinh Thanh--all located north of the 17th parallel, inside the DMZ. It also accuses the United States of sending planes to attack "a number of villages" in western Quang Binh.

The spokesman claims that the attacks "inflicted losses in human lives and property on the local people" and routinely demands an end to "all acts of encroachment on the sovereignty and security of the DRV." The last protest to mention casualties was the 22 September DRV Foreign Ministry statement which condemned the large-scale U.S. air strikes on the 21st.*

The intensive 21 September attacks are currently recalled in a 2 November NHAN DAN editorial which cites the bombing in September as "proof of the frenzied activities of the Nixon clique." They had also been recalled in an atypical 23 October Hanoi radio commentary which endorsed the spokesman's protest of 22 October; usually only the higher-level DRV Foreign Ministry statements prompt comment. The editorial on the 2d does not mention any of the more recent alleged attacks, but it goes on to urge vigilance and readiness to "smash all the enemy's adventurous activities," and particularly calls attention to the defense responsibilities of the 4th military region--in the southern part of the DRV.

* Foreign ministry spokesman's protests were issued on 27 September and 5, 9, 16, and 22 October. The most recent protests were reported in the 28 October TRENDS, pages 14-15.

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PRG, DRV OFFER AID FOR TYPHOON VICTIMS, DENOUNCE GVN RELIEF

Communist officials in North and South Vietnam responded to the damaging typhoon in South Vietnam's northern provinces--designated central Trung Bo by the communists--with standard messages of condolence and promises of relief assistance. Following the pattern of propaganda on similar floods last year, Vietnamese communist broadcasts devoted considerable attention to the disaster and there were reports of regional meetings in both North and South Vietnam offering support for the typhoon victims. Propaganda routinely charged that the Saigon government's relief efforts were merely a cover for schemes to extort money from the populace and repress the people in the flood-stricken area.

The PRG representation and NFLSV standing committee of central Trung Bo held a meeting on 24 October, according to broadcasts on the 26th, at which the conferees instructed organizations at all levels to muster forces to overcome the consequences of the typhoon and decided to appropriate 100 million piasters for relief work. Reports on the meeting routinely called for opposition to the GVN, charging that the "U.S.-Thieu clique" was "striving to take advantage" of difficulties to "engage in pacification, people herding, press ganging, and the scraping up of money through relief tricks."

A 27 October letter from NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho and PRG President Huynh Tan Phat called for further efforts to overcome the disaster and said that the PRG had decided to make 200 million piasters of public funds available as relief for the typhoon victims. It also urged vigilance and efforts to frustrate "the enemy's perfidious schemes and cruel acts."

On 28 October, North Vietnamese assistance to the typhoon victims was pledged in a message to Tho and Phat from DRV President Ton Duc Thang which asked that they "convey to the people in stricken areas our profound sympathy and a quantity of rice, textiles, and medicine." On the same day it was reported that DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi had received the acting head of the PRG representation in the DRV and requested him to "forward a gift of 40,000 tons of rice, four million meters of cloth, and 20 tons of medicine to the southern compatriots to help them solve the difficulties caused by the typhoon." Hanoi had publicized an identical list of assistance to flood victims in northern South Vietnam last fall.*

* Propaganda on the flooding in the northern provinces of South Vietnam last fall was discussed in the 12 November 1970 TRENDS, pages 12-14. That article erroneously reported that the DRV had offered 200 tons of medicine, rather than the correct figure of 20 tons.

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ALBANIA

HOXHA REJECTS FLEXIBLE TACTICS IN STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S.

Albania's relative isolation in the international communist movement and its apparent apprehensions over the course of Sino-American relations are reflected in initial available materials on the Sixth Albanian Workers Party (AWP) Congress which opened on 1 November. Where the Chinese, the North Vietnamese, the North Koreans, and the Romanians were represented at Politburo level at the Fifth Albanian Congress in 1966, this time the North Vietnamese delegates represent the only ruling party among the 26 assorted "Marxist-Leninist" parties and groups reported in attendance. Peking's absence is in line with its present policy of not attending foreign party congresses. It did not invite any guests to the Ninth CCP Congress in April 1969, and it did not send a delegation to the North Korean party congress in November 1970. The Chinese, however, have sought to offset the absence of a party delegation at the congress and to reassure their Tirana ally of continuing friendship by sending a "special" government delegation led by a vice minister to the 29 October inauguration of a hydroelectric power station, which Albanian propaganda has linked to the congress. And NCNA reported that the CCP leadership sent the "warmest greetings" to the AWP and to Hoxha on the opening of the congress.

Despite such reassuring gestures, Albanian misgivings over the PRC's pursuit of more flexible tactics in its foreign policy--which could result in Tirana's further isolation--seems registered in Hoxha's hardline congress report, which calls for an uncompromising struggle against the United States and the Soviet Union and pointedly warns against any "concessions or retreat" or any "hesitation" in the struggle against imperialism, cautioning that such approaches could be "full of dangerous consequences."

The foreign policy portion of Hoxha's lengthy report, available so far in summary form from the Albanian news agency, repeats many of the items in Tirana's standard catalogue of charges against the United States and the Soviet Union. But against the background of Peking's invitation to President Nixon and Moscow's current diplomatic offensive, Hoxha's unrelenting attacks on the United States--"which remains

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the chief enemy"--as well as his unequivocal "no" to Brezhnev's 24th CPSU Congress call for "normalized" relations with Tirana are especially noteworthy.

Some of Hoxha's most pointed remarks seem to be directed at China's newly flexible foreign policy, particularly the invitation to President Nixon and the ideological rationale for it advanced by Peking. Unlike Pyongyang, Tirana has never endorsed Peking's invitation to the President; on the contrary, its misgivings about the projected visit seemed to show through clearly in its treatment of the 15 July announcement. The party daily ZERI I POPULLIT carried the brief NCNA announcement of the invitation three days later, while Tirana radio and the Albanian news agency's service in English ignored it. On the 20th, an article in ZERI I POPULLIT used the occasion of the 17th anniversary of the Geneva agreements to make the point that the United States could not be trusted in international negotiations and to warn communists not to be taken in by "the partners of the revisionists." The article insisted that the United States is "the main enemy of the peoples; it is aggressive and will remain aggressive."

In the wake of the announcement of the President's forthcoming trip to Peking, an article in RED FLAG No. 9, given international dissemination in late August, had defended Peking's policy shift toward the United States on grounds of the need for maximum flexibility in distinguishing among its adversaries in order to isolate "the main enemy." By implication, Peking identified the Soviet Union as its principal antagonist and justified its dealings with the United States on the basis of changes in U.S. policy that offered a counterbalance to the Soviets.* In sharp contrast to this approach, Hoxha argues in his report that the United States and the Soviet Union are equally "dangerous, crafty, and aggressive." Since they are involved in "a counterrevolutionary alliance" directed against the national liberation movement and against China in particular, his argument runs, the struggle against them is indivisible:

Since American imperialism and revisionist imperialism represent the two imperialist superpowers and since they advertise a common counterrevolutionary strategy, it is impossible for the people's struggle against them not to be channelled into a single current. It is not possible to use one imperialism in order to oppose the other.

* The article is discussed in the TRENDS of 18 August, pages 19-22.

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Maintaining that American and Soviet efforts--and by implication also those of the Chinese--at promoting "tranquility" are directed at preserving "the status quo and their own alliances," Hoxha says "the revolutionary peoples do not want the imperialists' tranquility and peace." He sums up the lecture in declaring that "true peace and the people's security can be insured only by struggle against U.S. imperialism and the Soviet social imperialists."

Following a long attack on the United States capped by the dictum that "no free and independent country exists which is not in some way threatened by American imperialism," Hoxha calls for "an uncompromising, unrelenting struggle" against imperialism--a "confrontation" in which "there cannot be any period of calm or concessions or retreat, as the revisionists claim; any hesitation in the struggle against imperialism is full of very dangerous consequences." With this preface he drives home the point that

the attitude toward imperialism, and in the first place American imperialism, is the touchstone of the just orientation of all political forces in the world. This is not a question of purely tactical nature, nor a temporary stand depending on the circumstances. Each force's attitude toward imperialism originates from the content of its political line which permits an appreciation of practical actions. It determines, in short, the dividing line between those who defend the vital interests of the people and the future of humanity and those who trample the people underfoot, the line which separates the revolutionaries from the reactionaries and the traitors.

ALBANIAN-SOVIET
RELATIONS

Against the background of Brezhnev's call at the 24th CPSU Congress for "normalized" relations with Tirana, Hoxha comments--without further elaboration, to judge from the ATA summary--that "of late Soviet leaders have been making a show of wanting to 'normalize' relations with our country" and dismisses such overtures as "demagogic and an effort to exonerate themselves." He adds: "We shall not allow ourselves to be caught in their traps and will not be intimidated by their saber-rattling, any more than by the olive branch they wave; for they have great political, ideological, and economic debts to repay to Albania." As the Albanian press has done in the past, he goes on to imply that relations

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between the two countries could improve only if the current Soviet leadership is replaced: "There can be normalization only when the Soviet peoples and true Bolsheviks intervene to establish Marxist-Leninist revolutionary justice in respect of these questions."

In passages on Moscow's relations in the world movement, Hoxha inverts the Soviet line that the test of proletarian internationalism is loyalty to the USSR by declaring that the mark of "a real revolutionary" is unrelenting opposition to the Soviet revisionists and their anti-Marxist, imperialist line. In this context he launches into a scathing attack on Soviet "imperialist policies," including a lengthy diatribe against the Warsaw Five's invasion of Czechoslovakia, "the Brezhnev doctrine," and alleged Soviet efforts to stir up tensions in the Balkans.

PRC SENDS GREETINGS, DISPATCHES GOVERNMENT GROUP TO TIRANA

Peking's greetings message to the Albanian congress reflects its current flexible foreign policy line. Where the Chinese message to the Fifth AWP Congress in 1966--during Peking's isolationist phase at the start of the cultural revolution--had bitterly assailed both the Soviets and the Yugoslavs as "flunkies of imperialism" and charged that "every country where the revisionists are in power has either changed color or is in the process of doing so," the present message contains only a mild reference to U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism. In line with Peking's present policy, the 1971 message is signed impersonally by "the CCP Central Committee," where its 1966 counterpart was signed by Mao.

Differing degrees of anti-imperialist zeal marked the addresses by Chinese and Albanian speakers at the 29 October inauguration of the Mao Hydroelectric Plant, to which the Chinese sent a "special" government delegation. Albanian Politburo member Spiro Koleka used the occasion to hail what he pictured as a joint victory of the two countries in the United Nations over the United States, "the most aggressive chieftain of imperialism," adding that the UN vote to seat the PRC was also a victory over "those who plot with" the United States "against China and our country." In his remarks in reply, Chinese delegation head Chang Pin, vice minister of water conservancy

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and electric power, depicted Peking's seating in the United Nations as "a defeat of the plot of the U.S. imperialists for the isolation of China" but did not reciprocate Koleka's strong attack on the United States or his allusion to Soviet-American complicity. He merely noted blandly that "U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism are encountering difficulties both internally and externally."

Albanian media went out of their way to link the inauguration of the plant with the AWP Congress. Tirana noted that the event was taking place on the eve of the congress, and it suggested a link between the presence of the Chinese delegation and the congress by noting that portraits of Mao and Hoxha as well as streamers hailing the congress and Sino-Albanian friendship were in evidence at the inauguration. The importance attached to the occasion was underscored by the presence of Premier Shehu and most of the members of the Politburo.

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BREZHNEV IN FRANCE

VOLUMINOUS SOVIET COMMENT PLAYS UP POLITICAL IMPORT OF TRIP

The extensive Soviet propaganda fanfare surrounding Brezhnev's six-day visit to France--his first trip to the West since he assumed the party leadership--includes a larger volume of radio comment than has attended any Soviet leader's visit abroad since the Khrushchev era. Publicity for the 25-30 October visit, amounting to 34 percent of Radio Moscow's total comment in the week ending the 31st, falls only a few percentage points short of the publicity for Khrushchev's 11-day visit to France in the spring of 1960 during each of the two weeks spanning that visit and is roughly comparable to the radio propaganda attention to other Khrushchev trips in the early 1960's. Trips of the post-Khrushchev leaders abroad have normally drawn less than half this volume. In two notable recent exceptions, Brezhnev's 22-25 September visit to Yugoslavia preempted 20 percent of the week's Moscow radio comment, and the same volume was accorded Podgorny's 3-8 October visit to Hanoi.

Comment reviewing the visit emphasizes the point that the documents negotiated by Brezhnev have raised French-Soviet relations to a "qualitatively new level"--the language of Brezhnev's departure message to Pompidou, sent from aboard the plane en route to East Berlin. Against the background of Western press speculation that Brezhnev's aim was to secure French agreement to the conclusion of a bilateral friendship treaty, Moscow has sought to depict the documents--a joint declaration, a statement on "The Principles of Cooperation Between the USSR and France," and a 10-year economic, technical, and industrial cooperation agreement--as giving a "new impetus" to French-Soviet relations, raising them to a "higher level," and marking a "new stage" in growing bilateral cooperation.

In post-visit comment as in the anticipatory propaganda, Moscow carefully avoided the question of a friendship treaty; TASS predictably suppressed, in a brief summary of Marseilles' Socialist Mayor Defferre's speech on the 28th, the passages in which Defferre publicly--in Brezhnev's presence--expressed his dissatisfaction over the fact that there would be no friendship treaty. Obliquely responsive remarks by Brezhnev in his speech of reply were absent from an initial TASS account of the Soviet leader's speech but included in a second TASS version which quoted Brezhnev as saying he could not "yet speak about the final results" of the talks--"they will become known after our talks are completed."

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Moscow has attributed greater importance to the political results and implications of the visit, as expressed in the declaration and in the statement of principles, than to economic relations. A 1 November PRAVDA editorial on the visit ignored the 10-year economic agreement entirely, limiting its comment on economic matters to a single sentence noting that Brezhnev and Pompidou examined "various aspects" of bilateral economic, scientific-technical, and cultural relations. The official statements and propaganda have stressed the "special nature" of Soviet-French relations--attributed to De Gaulle's initiative of the mid-sixties and his 1966 visit to the USSR, carried forward by Pompidou's visit to the USSR in 1970 and the resulting protocol on political consultations, and now further enhanced in the statement of principles.

Moscow's treatment of the trip from the outset registered the special position France holds in Soviet relations with Western Europe and its importance in the current Soviet diplomatic offensive, as well as the buildup of Brezhnev's personal leadership role. While giving Kosygin's trip to Canada negligible propaganda preparation, Soviet media began the buildup for Brezhnev's trip well in advance. During the week preceding Kosygin's arrival in Ottawa on 17 October, Radio Moscow broadcast eight times as many commentary items on Brezhnev's forthcoming trip than on Kosygin's more imminent journey. The steadily intensifying propaganda effort consisted of daily radio and press commentaries, backgrounders on the evolution of Soviet-French cooperation, and interviews with Soviet and French spokesmen.

Soviet media referred to Brezhnev not only as CPSU General Secretary but also as a "member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium," his only governmental position, thus investing the trip with the status of an official state visit. France granted Brezhnev full honors due a head of state. Pompidou, in his presentation of his government's policies at the dinner on the 25th, referred to Brezhnev both as "Mr. General Secretary" and as "top leader of the Soviet Union," according to the TASS English text of the speech. However, indicating a measure of sensitivity with respect to the latter designation, the Moscow central press on the 26th rendered it "most responsible figure."

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STATEMENT OF
PRINCIPLES

The statement of principles signed by Brezhnev and Pompidou on the 30th outlines the general areas in which France and the USSR will further develop their political and economic cooperation. It underscores the "permanent" nature of Soviet-French cooperation and pledges both countries to apply their "political cooperation" in efforts to pacify "areas of conflict," ease international tensions, and settle disputes by peaceful means. The brief Soviet-French protocol signed during Pompidou's Moscow visit in October 1970 had called for regular political consultations between the foreign ministers or their designees "whenever necessary and, in principle, twice annually" on "major international problems of mutual interest." The statement now elaborates a "new development" of these consultations: They will make use of "both conventional diplomatic channels and special meetings of their representatives" to discuss issues specifically including European affairs and problems of international security.

Most notably among the "agreed" principles codified in the statement, the two sides pointed to the "importance" for Europe of Soviet-French cooperation and of cooperation "among all European states" based on inviolability of present borders (in effect registering agreement on the need to confirm the postwar status quo), noninterference in internal affairs, equality, independence, and renunciation of the use or threat of the use of force. At the same time, the exigencies of realpolitik are recognized elsewhere in the statement in what amounts to a caveat to these five precepts: The two sides record their "due consideration for the rights and prerogatives of other interested powers in the exercising of the responsibility" borne by France and the USSR--implicitly taking account of France's role in NATO and of the Soviet Union's stated resolve to protect the "socialist" system in the countries under its "proletarian internationalist" shield.

Where the October 1970 protocol had confined itself to outlining the forms of French-Soviet political consultation, the statement, after expanding on the forms, goes on to specify substantive areas in which fruitful cooperation could take place. These include general disarmament, first of all nuclear disarmament, and the elimination of "military-political groupings."

DECLARATION

The joint declaration, taking the place of a more routine "communiqué" on the talks, registers the "satisfaction" with the development of Soviet-French relations that was repeatedly emphasized by both leaders in speeches throughout the visit. Discussing accomplishments in bilateral relations in some detail, the document also touches on spheres of agreement with respect to European security, disarmament, the Middle East,

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Indochina,* India and Pakistan, and the United Nations--though without mentioning the PRC, whose membership was approved by the UNGA on the first day of Brezhnev's sojourn in France.

On the matter of bilateral relations, the declaration points in particular to the "more stable nature" of the 10-year economic agreement signed on 27 October. It concludes with the statement that both leaders confirmed the "special nature" of the relationship between the two countries--a reaffirmation of this long-standing formula against the background of the developing relations between Bonn and Moscow and of Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik.

Although the declaration makes no mention of an invitation to Pompidou to visit the Soviet Union, TASS reported on 30 October that Brezhnev had invited the French President to pay another official visit to the USSR and noted that Brezhnev also recalled Moscow's standing invitation to Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas.

EUROPEAN SECURITY As Kosygin had done during his visit to Canada, Brezhnev in France stressed the need to convene a conference on European security, treating the subject at greatest length in his speech at a dinner hosted by Pompidou on the 25th. Brezhnev referred to efforts of elements in Europe allegedly seeking to block a conference but concluded optimistically that the will of the peace-loving forces would prevail. Recalling that the Warsaw Pact states proposed a conference five years ago,** he observed that more and more states--

* See the Indochina section of this TRENDS.

** While Brezhnev presumably had in mind the July 1966 declaration issued at a Bucharest meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, Pact endorsement of a European security conference goes back to January 1965. At that time, a communique following a Political Consultative Committee meeting in Warsaw affirmed "support" of Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki's December 1964 proposal at the UN General Assembly for a conference to discuss measures for collective security in Europe. Subsequently, Warsaw Pact meetings at various levels have pressed the proposal and elaborated on it by suggesting an agenda, a list of participants, and a site.

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France included--have supported the proposal and that needed preparatory work for a conference has begun. Like Kosygin, he acknowledged that the United States and Canada should participate, a position in line with the memorandum of the 21-22 June 1970 meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in Budapest which had formalized the bid for U.S. and Canadian participation. The 30 October Soviet-French declaration also registered the hopes of both sides that preparations will be conducted to allow the convening of the conference in 1972. It referred to the creation of a system of commitments which would rule out the use or threatened use of force as one of the main tasks of the conference, which it said also should lead to broadened economic, trade, technical, and other ties on the continent.

In his brief two-day stopover in East Berlin en route home,* Brezhnev observed in passing in a 1 November dinner speech that prospects for the convening of a conference were good. In an apparent effort to assuage the GDR concerning its role in the conference, Brezhnev said at a later point in the address that the "equal participation of the German Democratic Republic in the solution of all problems involving the fate of the European continent" is necessary. The 1 November communique on the East Berlin visit contained similar language.

Brezhnev also took the occasion in France and the GDR to reaffirm Soviet interest in the opening of talks on force and armaments reduction in central Europe. He briefly mentioned the force-cut proposal in his dinner speech in Paris on the 25th as well as in his speech on French television on the 29th. And in his 1 November address in East Berlin he evinced cautious optimism when he stated that "apparently it will be possible in the not so remote future to start negotiations on reducing armaments and armed forces in Europe." Neither the Soviet-GDR communique nor the Soviet-French declaration mentioned force reductions.

A TASS dispatch on the 31st noted that a French Government spokesman at a press conference that day indicated that Pompidou and

* The East Berlin visit as a whole is discussed in this TRENDS under the heading "Brezhnev in GDR."

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Brezhnev gave consideration to the problem of reducing armed forces in Europe "on which their positions do not coincide and which is not mentioned in the Soviet-French declaration." TASS added, still quoting the French spokesman, that "in this connection, consultations will be conducted within the framework of the Franco-Soviet protocol." (The 26 October Soviet-Canadian communique did treat the force-cut proposal, noting that since the military confrontation in central Europe is "particularly dangerous," it was agreed that early steps should be taken to seek "a general agreement on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in that area without detriment to the participating states.")

Still another European security issue dealt with by Brezhnev in France was the liquidation of military blocs, a step long propagandized by Moscow and an element in the 31 March CPSU "peace program." In his speech in Paris on the 25th, Brezhnev noted with satisfaction the proximity of the USSR and France on "such cardinal questions as that of overcoming the division of the world into military-political groupings," observing that the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies "declared in no indefinite terms their readiness to work precisely in this direction." And on French television on the 29th he stated that the USSR was working for "replacing the opposing military blocs with peaceful equal cooperation of all states." The Soviet-French declaration noted that in the view of both sides the convening of a European security conference could facilitate the "overcoming of the continent's division into military-political groupings." And the 30 October Soviet-French cooperation accord pledged that both sides would work toward ending this division.

MEDITERRANEAN Speaking at a luncheon in Marseilles on 28 October, Brezhnev declared that Soviet Black Sea ports belong to the Mediterranean, in effect repeating Moscow's contention--advanced by Gromyko as long ago as a May 1968 interview--that the USSR, as a Black Sea power, is therefore a Mediterranean power. Brezhnev expressed the wish that the Mediterranean become a sea of peace and tranquillity, routinely adding that due to "Israel's aggression," the Middle East situation has poisoned the atmosphere in the area. Reminiscent of his remarks in his 30 March report to the CPSU Congress, Brezhnev stated that a settlement of the Middle East conflict would improve the situation in this area, and he added that Soviet-French cooperation could play an important role in this respect.

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In the CPSU congress report, Brezhnev had said that once a Middle East political settlement had been achieved it would be possible, in the Soviet view, to "consider further steps" at reducing tension in the region, particularly in turning the Mediterranean into a sea of peace and friendly cooperation. Similar statements appeared in the recent communiqus on Brezhnev's September visit to Yugoslavia and Kosygin's October visits to Algeria and Morocco, with the Soviet-Algerian communique additionally calling for removal of military bases in the Mediterranean. Routine propaganda has periodically repeated Brezhnev's March formulation as well as his remark, in his 11 June election speech, that the Soviet Union is prepared to solve "on an equal basis" the problem created by the navies of great powers cruising far from their own shores and is "ready to discuss any proposals." Specifically applying this suggestion to the Mediterranean, a Moscow commentary broadcast in Greek in early September described the "proposal for limitation of the navies of the great powers" as the first step toward normalization of the situation in the Mediterranean.

DISARMAMENT Brezhnev gave only passing attention to disarmament issues in his speeches in France, routinely endorsing the Soviet proposals for a world disarmament conference and a conference of the five nuclear powers to discuss nuclear disarmament. The declaration noted that both sides support efforts toward achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control. After endorsing the proposals for a world disarmament conference and five-power talks, it stated that both sides pursue a common goal in seeking the prohibition and destruction of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

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BREZHNEV IN GDR

SOVIET LEADER STRESSES COORDINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

In his main speech during his 30 October - 1 November stopover in East Berlin on the way home from France, Brezhnev emphasized Soviet-GDR concord and coordination in the sphere of foreign policy, in effect assuring his GDR hosts that they will be serving their own best interests in fulfilling their obligation to support the Soviet policy of European detente. Radio Moscow carried the first announcement of Brezhnev's plan to visit the GDR three days before his arrival there. His departure for home on 1 November took place "later than scheduled," according to a Moscow broadcast that day, and the joint communique was released in the evening after TASS announced that he had left East Berlin.

Discussion of bilateral party and state relations and of "topical problems of European and world politics" took place, according to the communique, "in a cordial and comradely atmosphere." At the 1 November luncheon at which the main speeches were delivered, SED First Secretary Honecker stated that the talks were marked by "full unanimity," and Brezhnev asserted in his speech of reply that there was "full unity of views on all questions discussed." No such formula, however, appeared in the communique.

Pledging in general terms that the GDR would "continue as before to work vigorously" for European detente in accordance with "the decisions of the Eighth SED Congress and the foreign policy agreed upon with the fraternal socialist states," Honecker predictably endorsed the results of Brezhnev's visit to France, the four-power agreement on "West Berlin," and a European security conference. While neither he nor Brezhnev directly mentioned the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with the FRG, both were endorsed in the joint communique.

Brezhnev was pointed and more explicit than Honecker on the matter of coordinating foreign policy positions and tactics, declaring that "the GDR and other fraternal socialist countries are together with us" and are "coordinating their foreign policy" and "agreeing on their foreign policy tactics." He coupled these statements with a strong new appeal for international recognition of the GDR, and he prefaced them

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with a reminder that "the fraternal relations between the GDR and its allies in the Warsaw Treaty, based on the principles of socialist internationalism," constitute the "guarantee" of the GDR's socialist system. Assuring his hosts that "the positions of socialism in the German Democratic Republic are inviolable," the Soviet leader declared that "the hopes entertained by some circles in the West to use the present political situation in order to try to weaken, to shake the positions of socialism in the GDR are empty, vain hopes."

TREATMENT OF ULRICHT In questionable status since his replacement by Honecker as SED first secretary in May, Walter Ulbricht was accorded correct treatment during Brezhnev's visit, with precedence over Premier Stoph. Thus at the conclusion of his 1 November luncheon speech, Brezhnev toasted "Comrade Honecker, Comrade Ulbricht, Comrade Stoph," and the joint communique listed first in the roster of East German participants in the talks, after Honecker, "member of the Politburo of the SED, chairman of the State Council of the GDR W. Ulbricht." At the same time, Ulbricht's continued poor health--the stated reason for his stepdown from the party leadership--seemed indicated by his absence from the sizeable array of SED Politburo members present at the East Berlin airport to greet Brezhnev on 30 October and to see him off on the afternoon of 1 November.

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KOSYGIN IN CUBA

JOINT COMMUNIQUE REGISTERS "COMPLETE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING"

Soviet Premier Kosygin's 26-30 October "friendly visit" to Cuba proceeded in the spirit of the effusive welcome attending his arrival at the airport, with large crowds turning out to greet the visitor as he toured the island with Castro as guide. PRENSA LATINA described the welcome in Santiago de Cuba, despite a heavy rain, as "one of the warmest ever given to anyone in that city," where Kosygin visited the Moncada barracks and other historical sites connected with the Cuban revolution. Castro honored Kosygin at an official reception on the evening of the 28th, following the windup that day of two mornings of talks which the 1 November communique says took place in an atmosphere of "friendship and complete mutual understanding." The Soviet embassy held a reception on the 29th. While the visit was heavily and enthusiastically publicized in reportage by both Moscow and Havana media, scant comment on both sides contained little of substance. There were no major speeches by either Castro or Kosygin, although both made off-the-cuff remarks at various stops on their tours.

The single formal substantive item to result from the visit, the communique of 1 November, deals largely in stock terms with international topics of mutual concern and treats such sensitive issues as Latin American revolutionary strategy in flexible generalities. But the appearance of the communique of itself, along with the elaborateness of the Cuban welcome, served to dramatize the marked warming of Soviet-Cuban relations since their low ebb at the time of Kosygin's 26-30 June 1967 visit to Cuba, en route home from the Glassboro talks, when no Cuban crowds turned out to greet him and no communique was issued.

The wide-ranging document depicts a cordial, "fraternal" Soviet-Cuban relationship, hails an upsurge of the revolutionary movement in Latin America, and touches in general terms on international issues including Indochina, Korea, the Middle East, Europe, and disarmament. A call for the simultaneous admission of the GDR and FRG to the United Nations precedes a brief expression of satisfaction at the vote to seat the PRC in the United Nations. On the subject

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of Cuban-U.S. relations, the document merely reiterates Soviet condemnation of the U.S. blockade "and different U.S.-encouraged hostile actions, including piratic actions and violations of air-space," and reaffirms Soviet opposition to the "unlawful" U.S. military presence at Guantanamo "in Cuban territory."

The communique also contains general statements of support for the national liberation movement worldwide and for the struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism, a call for unity of the socialist countries, and a reaffirmation and acceptance of a Soviet invitation to Castro to visit the Soviet Union. No date is specified. In his radio feature on 2 November, Havana commentator Guido Garcia Inclan remarked that Castro "has said he will visit Chile and from there, we believe, he will continue on to Moscow because he has accepted Kosygin's invitation."

STRATEGY FOR
LATIN AMERICA

The formulations in the communique on Latin America are sufficiently general to encompass the stated strategies of both the Soviet Union and Castro with respect to the revolutionary movement in the hemisphere. The formulations indicate neither concessions nor major points of discord. The revolutionary situation in Latin America is portrayed in standard terms as increasingly favorable for the struggle against the domination of imperialism and reactionary "oligarchies connected with it."

Specifically citing only Chile and Peru, the communique declares Soviet-Cuban "solidarity" with Allende's Popular Unity government in Chile and with "the structural changes being carried out by the Government of Peru." Castro in the past has spoken favorably of "the revolutionary processes" under way in Peru but, as in the communique, has stopped short of unqualified support for the Peruvian Government. Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa, in a Lima interview carried by the Madrid EFE on 2 November, remarked that Cuba "continues to maintain that the fastest way to seize the government and the best way to establish changes is by armed struggle; but we also admit that there are other ways, such as the Chilean and the Peruvian."

The communique expresses "resolute support" for the economic and social measures taken in Peru and Chile to recover their national wealth and to strengthen their economic and political independence, and it condemns the imperialist practice of "economic repressions aimed at preserving the exploitation and oppression of peoples of these countries."

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Panama is the only other Latin American country to be specifically mentioned in the communique--in the context of support for efforts of developing countries to achieve "national independence and full sovereignty." The two sides express "sympathy" with the Panamanian people's quest for "full sovereignty over the whole of their national territory."

There is no mention either of the August Bolivian coup or of the situation in Uruguay, on which Havana has hedged its bets by supporting both the Tupamaro guerrillas and the electoral Broad Front pursuing the parliamentary road with Uruguayan Communist Party participation. A past sore point in Soviet-Cuban relations--perennially strained over the conflict between militant Castroite tactics and the via pacifica espoused by the Soviet-leaning communist parties--is skirted by a broad focus on the "revolutionary movement" in Latin America, with no mention of the communist movement or of any communist party.

SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONSHIP After describing the atmosphere of the first morning of the Castro-Kosygin talks on 27 October as one of "fraternal friendship, cordiality, and comradely frankness," TASS characterized the session on the morning of the 28th as marked by "a heartfelt comradely atmosphere which corresponds to the relations of fraternal friendship between the two countries." Havana media simply reported the talks without characterizing them. But in reporting that Castro had persuaded Kosygin to make a few remarks to Cubans during a visit to a housing project on the 27th, Havana quoted the Soviet premier as commenting: "You must have noticed how fast we were able to reach an agreement with Comrade Fidel. I want to tell you that not only have we been able to reach a fast agreement in this, but in other matters we have been able to reach a fast agreement as well." Moscow carried a much briefer account of Kosygin's remarks, excluding this passage.

Demonstrating the sharp improvement in bilateral relations since Kosygin's 1967 visit, the communique also registers the progress made since Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa visited Moscow in June of this year. The communique on Roa's 10-21 June visit was cordial but more restrained than the present one. It reported talks in "an atmosphere of cordiality and mutual understanding," as compared with the "complete" mutual understanding this time, and it expressed satisfaction only that Soviet-Cuban relations were "continuing to develop successfully in all fields." This time the Kosygin-Castro document puts on record both sides'

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"profound satisfaction with the active and fruitful all-round cooperation" between the two countries and notes Cuba's "sincere gratitude" for the USSR's "constant assistance and support," regarded by the Cubans as "an invaluable contribution" to the country's development. The Soviet side reaffirms its "readiness to continue all-round support" to the Cuban people in strengthening socialist gains and coping with "imperialist provocations." Soviet aid, in similar generalities, has been a major theme of Moscow's comment on the visit.

The communique is vague on the outlines of future cooperation. It notes only that the leaders discussed the further strengthening of bilateral relations in the political, economic, cultural, "and other spheres." Neither Soviet nor Cuban comment has been more specific.

Both Soviet and Cuban media have publicized the 31 October-9 November visit to Cuba of a detachment of Soviet naval ships--publicity perhaps generated by the proximity of that visit to Kosygin's. The last such naval visit, in late May and early June of this year, went unmentioned in Soviet and Cuban media beyond an initial advance announcement that it would take place. The current squadron is said to consist of two antisubmarine ships, two submarines, and an oil tanker.

CUBAN COMMENTATOR TAKES NEW CONCILIATORY TACK TOWARD U.S.

While the communique on the Castro-Kosygin talks brushes broadly over the subject of Cuban-U.S. relations in the usual negative terms, a hint of Cuban receptivity to possible U.S. overtures for an improvement in relations has appeared in recent radio features by the gadfly Havana commentator Guido Garcia Inclan. Garcia has spoken on many past occasions about subjects ignored in Cuban comment at large; on some domestic subjects, he has anticipated lines later introduced by Castro, although the precise nature of his relationship to the regime is unknown.

On 23 October, with reference to Kosygin's visit, Garcia Inclan noted U.S. speculation and concern whenever a Soviet leader or a Soviet fleet visits Cuba and declared that "the Yankees cannot stand our friendship with other peoples of the world" and "they make every effort under the table to win over Castro." He went on to say: "Our Fidel has said it may times: face to face, man to man, under the same terms, under the same rules, with mutual

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respect, under the same conditions, we are always ready to talk." More recently, on 2 November, Garcia used his device of a "Letter From Freddy"--a fictional itinerant correspondent--to reinforce the point with the general observation that "diplomacy has greatly changed. The men who could not tolerate each other yesterday, today are shaking hands."

"Freddy" also took a notably conciliatory line toward the United States as compared with other Cuban comment on the issue raised by the dispatch of a Cuban delegation to the international sugarcane technicians' conference which opened in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on 26 October. Where other Cuban comment on the incident has charged the U.S. Government with "one more act of aggression," a "new infamy," and "arbitrary and discriminatory" action against the Cuban delegation, Garcia Inclan's "Freddy" said in his 2 November letter "I cannot blame the immigration department" and suggested that "maybe those who have done wrong" are the other participants in the meeting, "because there should have been no meeting and the international organization should have protested before Nixon and the UN."

If Garcia Inclan's remarks indeed represent trial balloons inspired by the regime, the dispatch of the Cuban delegation to New Orleans without the proper visas could have been undertaken for more complex motives than a mere desire to embarrass Washington. Castro may have wished to test U.S. reactions in the climate marked by new developments in U.S.-PRC and U.S.-Soviet relations, against the background of Cuba's movement toward improvements in relations with some Latin American governments.

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MIDDLE EAST

USSR CONTINUES TO DISPARAGE U.S. INTERIM SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL

Moscow continues to denigrate U.S. efforts to promote an interim Middle East settlement on the Suez Canal on the grounds that Washington aims at separating the Suez issue from an overall settlement and at impeding solution of the "key problem" of Israeli withdrawal. Thus a 28 October TASS dispatch from New York, reporting Jarring's departure from the United Nations for his ambassadorial post in Moscow, claims that the Jarring mission has been impeded not only by Israel's "irreconcilable stand" but also by the U.S. initiative on a "so-called interim settlement" concerning reopening the Suez Canal. TASS does not go so far as to reject the idea of an interim settlement, but it does criticize Washington's suggestions as being "drawn up on terms unacceptable" to Egypt.* The dispatch fails to spell out any Egyptian objections, nor does it elucidate regarding the U.S. proposals.

This pattern is consistent with Moscow's failure to acknowledge the six points advanced by Secretary Rogers in his 4 October UNGA address in connection with a Suez Canal agreement--relationship of interim and overall settlements, cease-fire, zone of withdrawal, supervisory arrangements, Egyptian presence east of the canal, and use of the canal.** Soviet media in reporting the speech made no mention of Rogers' discussion of an interim settlement, merely claiming that he called on the Arabs to give up their demand for withdrawal. But PRAVDA's Kolesnichenko, speaking on the 10 October Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable, had disparaged the secretary's proposal "to concentrate on so-called interim agreements." At the same time, however, Kolesnichenko conceded that in principle an interim agreement--"say an agreement on

* Cairo radio on the 28th first reported the TASS dispatch without mentioning the reference to "unacceptable terms"; a later Cairo newscast cited TASS as saying the views presented by Secretary Rogers at the UNGA "include conditions Egypt cannot accept."

** In reporting Egyptian President as-Sadat's 16 September speech, Moscow took no note of his discussion of these same points, which he said had been the center of Assistant Secretary Sisco's July-August talks in Israel.

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opening the Suez Canal"--could be "of some advantage." Such a settlement, he explained, should not freeze settlement of the "main question, the key problem" of the Middle East-- withdrawal of Israeli troops. Judging from Rogers' remarks, he said, the United States was banking on precisely this so that the occupation might continue.

While downgrading U.S. efforts to promote an interim settlement, Moscow has taken note of Israeli reluctance to commit itself to discussions on the matter. TASS on 30 October, for example, reported Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban as declaring that his government was intent on boycotting talks on reopening the canal and added that, "resorting to blackmail," Eban said resumption of U.S. deliveries of Phantom planes would probably influence Israel's attitude on the canal question. And an Arabic-language broadcast on the 31st claimed that in radio statements Golda Meir and Abba Eban had completely rejected discussion of the problem of opening the canal. Earlier, a 17 October RED STAR article by Vasilyev and Gavrilov had attributed to Western news agencies a report that the Israeli cabinet rejected an "American version of the agreement on opening the Suez Canal" because it even vaguely mentioned partial withdrawal of Israeli forces. A Volskiy article in NEW TIMES (No. 44, 29 October) provided a stereotyped explanation of U.S.-Israeli differences, pointing to the "allocation of roles": Washington would like to appear in Arab eyes as an honest broker, and it was clearly an advantage when Israel paraded its dissatisfaction with certain U.S. statements.

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